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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
logically extended, calls for the availability of counsel at the
revocation proceeding. It is submitted that if, as recognized in
Mempa, there is a right to counsel at the initial sentencing stage,
there should be a corresponding right at the probation revoca-
tion because a revocation, like initial sentencing, determines the
length of imprisonment and is part of the prosecution process.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court has granted cer-
tiorari in the Scarpelli case thus paving the way for a definitive
ruling on this question. The Advisory Committee favors the
approach indicated in Scarpelli by recommending that the pro-
bationer be entitled to counsel at probation revocation proceed-
ings regardless of constitutional requirements.17
Conclusion
This comparison of Louisiana probation laws and the Amer-
ican Bar Association recommendations suggests several areas
which are in need of legislative consideration. It is submitted
that not only do certain procedural changes need to be made,
but new policies and guidelines should be implemented to aid
in the effective application of probation in the correctional
process. By adopting the Standards, these necessary changes
may be accomplished.
Pamela A. Prestridge
LOUISIANA AND CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
In recent years, the subject of discovery in criminal cases
has inspired great interest and much discussion. This is un-
doubtedly due in no small measure to the success of discovery in
civil proceedings. The question is often asked, why should there
be a difference between civil and criminal proceedings with re-
spect to discovery? The varied responses to this question will
be discussed in some detail. Perhaps the best answer is that
given by Justice Traynor of the California supreme court who
characterized the resistance to criminal discovery as founded in
"the force of adrenal reaction against seemingly plausible men-
aces."'
107. ABA STANDARDS, PROBATION 69.




The profuseness of materials recently published on the sub-
ject suggests that the problem is a new one. By comparison to
the development of civil discovery, however, the question of
criminal discovery is ancient. It was involved in a 1792 English
case in which the defendant, charged with peculation and cor-
ruption, applied for an order allowing him to inspect a report
made in India on his activities in that country. Without dis-
cussing the admissibility or the materiality of the report, Chief
Justice Lord Kenyon wrote, "There is no principle or precedent
to warrant it. Nor was such a motion as the present ever made;
and if we were to grant it, it would subvert the whole system
of criminal law."3
The question was raised for the first time in our country only
fifteen years later in United States v. Burr.4 That decision sug-
gested that the United States would not follow the English com-
mon law in this respect. A request was made for pre-trial in-
spection of a letter addressed to the President of the United
States which was in the possession of the United States Attorney.
Although Chief Justice Marshall, who wrote the opinion, did not
hold that there was an absolute right to discovery, he did ex-
press the view that fairness would not permit the letter to be
withheld from the defendant if it had evidentiary relevance or
would be useful in cross-examination of a government witness.
Ironically, it seems that both of these cases were forgotten.
In England today, the discovery available to a defendant charged
with a serious offense that is prosecuted upon indictment is
greater than that available in any state or under federal proce-
dure.5 The requirement of disclosure is so strictly enforced that
the prosecution cannot use at trial the testimony of any witness
discovered subsequent to the preliminary hearing unless the
defendant has been informed of the identity of the witness and
the content of his expected testimony. At the preliminary hear-
ing, the defendant is informed of the entire case against him.6
2. King v. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792).
3. Id. at 1249.
4. 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
5. H. PALMER, WILSHIRE'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 1961); Traynor,
Ground Lost and Found in Cr inal Dicovery in England, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rsv.
749 (1964).
6. The Louisiana supreme court discussed English discovery practices
in the landmark case State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So.2d 273 (1945), and
the absence of unfavorable reports probably had an effect on the decision
to permit discovery of the defendant's written confession.
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As an authority for criminal discovery in America, United
States v. Burr7 has had no effect. The question of criminal dis-
covery did not reappear in reported cases for more than a cen-
tury. When it next surfaced, it received a different reception.8
Although it would be incorrect to suggest that our courts were
unanimously opposed to discovery,9 the clear weight of authority
was to the effect that it had no place in the administration of
criminal justice.10
Arguments Pro and Con
A 1953 opinion" of the New Jersey supreme court expressed
many of the objections to criminal discovery that are raised to-
day. On review of an order granting the defendant the right to
inspect his confession, and in response to an argument based on
the satisfactory experience with civil discovery, Justice Vander-
bilt wrote:
"In criminal proceedings long experience has taught the
courts that often discovery will lead not to honest fact find-
ing, but on the contrary to perjury and the suppression of
evidence. Thus the criminal who is aware of the whole case
against him will often procure perjured testimony in order
to set up a false defense. Another result of full discovery
7. 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
8. Murphy, Criminal Discovery: What Progress Bince U.S. v. Aaron Burr,
2 CRIM. L. BULL. 3 (1966). The thought of criminal discovery sent Judge
Learned Hand into such a rage that he wrote: "Under our criminal proce-
dure the accused has every advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly
to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is
Immune from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted
when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve.
Why In addition he should in advance have the whole evidence against him
to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have
never been able to see .... Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness
to the accused. Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of
the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear
is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays
and defeats the prosecution of crime." United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646,
649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
9. E.g., State v. Tippett, 317 Mo. 319, 296 S.W. 132 (1927). The Missouri
supreme court, unable to find precedent In any criminal cases, cited a civil
case as authority. Although Tippett was only In effect for three years before
being overruled, the reasoning exhibited by the court is strikingly similar
to that of modern writers arguing for criminal discovery.
10. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); State v. Tune,
13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953); Lemon v Supreme Court of N.Y., 245 N.Y.
24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927).
11. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
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would be that the criminal defendant who is informed of
the names of all the State's witnesses may take steps to
bribe or frighten them into giving perjured testimony or
into absenting themselves so that they are unavailable to
testify. Moreover, many witnesses, if they know that the
defendant will have knowledge of their names prior to trial,
will be reluctant to come forward with information during
the investigation of the crime. All these dangers are more
inherent in criminal proceedings where the defendant has
much more at stake, often his own life, than in civil pro-
ceedings."12
Justice Vanderbilt was obviously concerned over the oppor-
tunity criminal discovery would afford perjurers. It is interest-
ing to observe, however, that in civil proceedings discovery is
relied upon to curb the possibility of perjury.13 Aside from that
passing observation, there are two considerations that strip such
an argument of its force. The more obvious is that any system
of discovery rules will provide for some form of protective
order.14 While the vast majority of criminal proceedings do not
involve organized crime or other special circumstances that would
make the threat of perjury or intimidation of witnesses any
greater with or without discovery, protective orders should be
liberally given when there is legitimate reason to fear these
things.
Following the decision of California v. Green 5 in 1970, there
is even less merit to an argument against criminal discovery
based on fear of perjury and witness intimidation. Under that
decision prior inconsistent statements of a witness may be used
as substantive evidence against the accused. Admittedly, the
procedural safeguards that are necessary to avoid violation of
the defendant's right to confrontation are not normally incident
12. Id. at 210, 98 A.2d at 884. (Citations omitted.)
13. An obvious example of a way discovery can be used to reduce the
possibility of perjury is that a deposition taken early in a proceeding
can prevent a witness or party from making up a story to conform with
the developing evidence. Similarly, knowledge of the evidence that an
opponent plans to introduce gives a party an opportunity to find new facts
that may rebut or explain the other's evidence. See Freedman, Discovery
as am Instrument of Justice, 22 TEMPLE L.Q. 174 (1948).
14. E.g., ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY & PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 4.4 (approved
draft 1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY].
15. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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to a Louisiana criminal proceeding.' This could, however, be
provided for concomitant with the adoption of a system of dis-
covery provisions.
More modern arguments against full discovery by the de-
fense sound more sophisticated.
"[I]f adversariness is still to be retained as the model for
fairness in our criminal system, full prosecutorial disclosure
would appear to weight the balance of advantage in favor
of the accused. This would diminish the capacity of the
system to perform equitably, since two generally equal ad-
versaries are necessary for such performance.' 17
A defendant, however, particularly an indigent defendant, is
seldom if ever an equal adversary to the state. This was dra-
matically demonstrated by Professor Goldstein in 1960.18 Al-
though the procedural reforms of the 1960's require that the
question be re-examined, many of his observations should be
valid today, particularly those concerning the prosecutor's burden
of proof and the presumption of innocence. 19 Likewise, Gold-
stein's observations as to the availability of discovery in favor
of the state appear to further reflect the state's overall superior
position. Devices such as the grand jury to gather information
and enforce the cooperation of witnesses, interrogation of the
accused prior to trial, and the massive resources of the state to
carry on investigations are splendid means of discovery. 20 When
16. Preliminary examinations are not frequently used in Louisiana.
While Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 292 appears to make
a preliminary examination mandatory If requested prior to indictment or
Information, this right can be defeated by the subsequent finding of indict-
ment or filing of information. See State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So.2d
484 (1969), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 949 (1971).
17. Liles & Patterson, Prosecutorial Disclosure: In Camera and Beyond,
22 FLA. L. REv. 491, 508-09 (1970).
18. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.. 1149 (1960).
19. See Williams, The Trial of a Criminal Case, 29 N.Y.S.B. Buu.m 36, 42
(1957): "[T]he statistics kept by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts last year show that in 99 per cent . . . of all the criminal
cases tried in the eighty-six judicial districts at the federal level, defendants
who did not take the stand were convicted by juries . . . . The fact of the
matter Is that a defendant who does not take the stand does not in reality
enjoy any longer the presumption of innocence."
20. These are discussed at somewhat greater lengths in Nakell, Criminal
Discovery for the Defense and the Prosecution-The Developing Constitu-
tional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REv. 437 (1972).
[Vol. 33
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notice-of-alibi 2' and insanity 2 statutes are added to these devices,
it is apparent that the state occupies a favorable position.
Removal of the argument to the vague, conceptual plane of
adversariness adds nothing to its merit; rather it tends to ob-
scure the real problem. The only important question is whether
more liberal discovery will lead to a better, more efficient system
of justice and aid the court in its search for truth, or will it
hinder the prosecution of crime to such an extent that society
will suffer?
The focus should not be on the relative strengths and weak-
nesses of the sides of a criminal proceeding, but rather on more
fundamental interests of the defendant and society. Criminal
defendants are either innocent or guilty. Both have the same
interest with reference to the criminal proceeding, to be able to
present their best possible defense. This can be achieved only
with full knowledge of the facts surrounding the case. If the
defendant were actually presumed innocent, then he would also
have to be presumed ignorant of the facts concerning the crime
with which he is charged.
Society's most fundamental interest in a criminal proceed-
ing is dual. The more obvious is the conviction and punishment,
or perhaps rehabilitation of those who have committed crime.
Equally as important, however, is the acquittal of the innocent,
for their conviction undermines the judicial process upon which
society depends. It is therefore in the interest of society to give
the defendant an opportunity to present his best defense, at least
to the extent that the other interest is not defeated.
Justice Vanderbilt referred to the teaching of long experience
that discovery will lead to perjury and the suppression of evi-
dence.2 If this were true, it would end the discussion of dis-
covery immediately, but as Justice Brennan observed, the courts
have had no such experience.2 4 Even today with criminal dis-
covery having progressed rather dramatically in some jurisdic-
tions over the last twenty years, there has been relatively little
experience with the subject. The indications are, however, that
this experience is teaching a different lesson.
21. Bee Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
22. See LA. CODE Cum. P. art. 651.
23. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 208, 98 A.2d 881 (1953)
24. 14. (dissenting opinion).
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In Vermont there arose what has been described as an open-
file practice of criminal discovery following the enactment in
1961 of a statute allowing the defendant to take the deposition
of a state witness before trial.2 5 One of the few evaluations of
discovery in practice has been made on the Vermont experi-
ence.'26 The study made three significant revelations:
1. Not a single judge, prosecutor or defense counsel had
called for a return to the prior restrictive law.
2. There was a significant decrease in the likelihood of trial.
3. After reviewing the arguments against discovery includ-
ing "possible intimidation of witnesses, better opportu-
nity to prepare perjured testimony, harassment of prose-
cutors and police officers, extra burden on the prosecu-
tion officer, increased costs of the administration of crimi-
nal law, etc.," the author concluded that these fears had
been proved imaginary.2
Perhaps more important is the fact that discovery is rapidly
gaining ground throughout the nation.2 As Professor Wright
has observed, "[t]he trend toward free disclosure is unmistak-
able."29
Criminal Discovery in Louisiana
A thorough discussion of criminal discovery has not been
presented in Louisiana jurisprudence. Strangely, the decision
as to whether the defendant is entitled to evidence before trial
has turned on a consideration of the Public Records Act. The
act gives an almost all-encompassing definition of public rec-
25. 13 VT. STAT. ANN. § 6721 (1961).
26. Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J.
732 (1967).
27. Id. at 737.
28. See Zagel & Carr, State Criminal Discovery and the New Illinois
Rules, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 557 (1971), which includes a textual review of the
discovery laws of some of the more progressive states, and rather compre-
hensive appendices dealing with all the states; and Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 8
(1966).
29. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 252 (1969).
30. LA. R.S. 44:1-39 (1950). The specific provision is that part of 44:3A
which follows the broad definition of public records and makes an excep-
tion to it: "This Chapter shall not apply to public records when they are
held by any sheriff, district attorney, police officer, investigator or inves-
tigating agency of the state as evidence in the investigation or prosecution
of a criminal charge, until after the public records have been used in open
court or the criminal charge has been finally disposed of."
[Vol. 33
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ords81 and, with certain exceptions, grants any elector or tax-
payer the right to examine or copy the records.32 The function
and scope of the Act have never been entirely clear, particularly
in relation to criminal discovery. In 1964, however, the Louisiana
supreme court in State v. Pailet38 referred to "[t]he well-estab-
lished rule that all evidence relating to a pending criminal case
which is in the possession of the State is privileged and not sub-
ject to inspection by the accused unless and until it is offered
in evidence at the trial. '3 4 Presumably, the court was referring
to the fact that such evidence is excluded from the operation of
the Public Records Act. This, so far as has been determined, is
the first case to use the term "privileged," and it was the only
case cited in a later case85 asserting the same proposition.
There was some discussion of the Public Records Act in
State v. Dorsey,3 6 but in granting an accused the right to pre-
trial inspection of his written confession, the court concluded
that a confession is not a public record. Although there is some
language that suggests that the court might have thought evi-
dence in the hands of the state should be privileged, there is
just as much reason to believe that the court viewed R.S. 44:337
as merely an exception not bearing on the question of discovery.
After a discussion of the development of liberal criminal dis-
covery practices in England and notice of the fact that the
defendant had no such right at common law, the court said:
"[W]e see no necessity for following the old common-law rule
in this State, in the absence of any prohibiting statute or deci-
sions of this court on the point, solely and only for the reason
that several states in the Union continue to do so."38 (Emphasis
added.)
Two years later the court again had occasion to consider
the effect of the Public Records Act as it relates to criminal
discovery.8 9 It was urged by the accused that he should have
access to the police report on his alleged crime because it should
31. LA. R.S. 44:1 (1950).
32. Id. 44:31.
33. 246 La. 483, 165 So.2d 294 (1964).
34. Id. at 497, 164 So.2d at 299.
35. State v. Hunter, 250 La. 295, 195 So.2d 273 (1967).
36. 207 La. 928, 22 So.2d 273 (1945).
37. See note 30 supra.
38. State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 963-64, 22 So.2d 273, 284 (1945).
39. State v. Mattio, 212 La. 284, 31 So.2d 801 (1947).
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be considered a public record. Unlike other cases, it was the
defendant rather than the state seeking support from the Act.
During the course of the opinion, the court expressed doubt as
to whether a police report is a public record, but determined
that if it were a public record, it would be within the exception
in section 3 of the Act.41
Even after the court first expressed the opinion that evi-
dence in the possession of the state relating to a pending criminal
case was "privileged,' 42 there was good reason to believe that it
was within the trial court's discretion to allow discovery. The
supreme court had touched upon this issue in State v. Dowdy.4s
These defendants excepted to the refusal of the trial judge to
permit them to subpoena for inspection a fuse, dynamite caps
and clothing of the man they were charged with having mur-
dered. In upholding the trial judge, the court said, "their ap-
plication therefore was a matter which addressed itself to the
discretion of the trial judge, 'whose ruling will be set aside only
upon a showing of gross abuse of discretion.' -44 Two years before
Dowdy the court had spoken of the plenary power of the trial
judge, to be exercised within his sound discretion, to order the
production of evidence in the hands of third persons which is
sought on behalf of the prosecution or the defense.45 It is inter-
esting to note that the court cited Article VII of the Louisiana
Constitution, sections 28 and 83, as authority for its position.4
That was at a time before the concept of "privilege" had been
developed, so there should have been no difference had a defen-
dant requested evidence from the state. Likewise, if the source
of the plenary power of the trial judge is the constitution, the
legislature was without power to create a privilege in favor of
the state.
Despite these considerations, the supreme court in State v.
Hunter47 reversed a trial judge who ordered the state to furnish
40. E.g., State v. Vallery, 214 La. 495, 38 So.2d 148 (1948).
41. La. Acts 1940, No. 195 § 3, which is now LA. R.S. 44:3 (1950). See
note 30 supra.
42. State v. Pallet, 246 La. 483, 165 So.2d 294 (1964).
43. 217 La. 773, 47 So.2d 496 (1950).
44. Id. at 786, 47 So.2d at 501.
45. State v. Wilde, 214 La 453, 38 So.2d 72 (1948).
46. The court was obviously thinking in constitutional terms, but there
must have been a misprint because those provisions are not authority for
the statements made by the court.
47. 250 La. 295, 195 So.2d 273 (1967).
[Vol. 33
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more evidence than was common. In earlier cases the question
had been whether the trial judge had abused discretion in
denying discovery, whereas in Hunter, the question of discre-
tion was raised by the state. The conclusion became inescapable
that the trial judge was without power to order discovery. It
is obvious from the evidence ordered furnished to the defendant
in Hunter, that the test was not to be "gross abuse of discre-
tion."
The practical effect of Palet" and Hunter"0 was to provide
the court with the label "privilege" when upholding a chal-
lenged refusal to order discovery. It was applied without ques-
tion or comment in State v. Clack,51 a case that was to become
better known under the name Clack v. Reid,5 2 in which the
Fifth Circuit reversed the case in part on the question of dis-
covery.
The authority of the decision is diminished by the cir-
cumstances by which it came before the court and its unim-
pressive disposition. For some reason, apparently unknown to
the court, the state was not notified of the appeal, and it did
not appear for oral argument or file a brief. The issue of pre-
trial examination was remanded in order to give the state an
opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, the court made it clear
that the question of criminal discovery could no longer be
ignored or silenced with a label of privilege. Referring to the
defendant's motion for pretrial examination of the marijuana
gleanings he was charged with possessing, the court said, "To
deny a defendant a fair opportunity to present competent proof
in his defense is the denial of a fair trial and of due process."
Although the statement was dictum, as will be seen, it was not
48. The judge had ordered pretrial inspection of the weapon used in
the crime, the written confessions and statements of the. accused, the gist
of oral confessions and statements, all photographs held by the state,
clothing and physical evidence, correct information concerning the police
station where the defendant was booked and the names and addresses of
the arresting officers. Nothing in the order could have possibly prejudiced
the state in its case.
49. State v. Pallet, 246 La. 483, 165 So.2d 294 (1964).
50. State v. Hunter, 250 La. 295, 195 So.2d 273 (1967).
51. 254 La. 61, 222 So.2d 857 (1969).
52. 441 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1971).
53. id. at 804.
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without support, and may well be the logical outgrowth of
Brady v. Maryland 4 and its progeny.
Louisiana responded with State v. Migliore.55 Like Clack,
that case involved a request for pretrial inspection of the drugs
that the defendant was charged with having illegally possessed.
Surprisingly, the trial judge relied on the state court decision
in Clack and denied the request. Using very guarded language,
the Louisiana supreme court reversed the decision. The court
apparently did not intend to say anything that could be con-
strued as a broad approval of criminal discovery or an exten-
sion of discovery beyond the facts of Clack.
The decision does, however, make two things clear. The
defendant has a right to pretrial inspection of a substance, if
there is a sufficient amount, in cases where his guilt or innocence
turns upon analysis of that substance. It is also clear that State
v. Hunter" has been overruled in as far as it stripped the trial
judge of discretion to order pretrial inspection of evidence other
than the defendant's written confession.
"Even though as stated supra the Louisiana Code of Crim-
inal Procedure does not allow formal pre-trial discovery in
criminal cases, much discretion is vested in the trial judge
with respect to bills of particulars and the furnishing of
evidence requested by the defendant. '57
Beyond these two things it is unknown whether Migliore will
have any appreciable effect.58 The case should not be hailed
as a great advance toward a more liberal attitude concerning
criminal discovery; in fact, it adds nothing really new to the
jurisprudence. 9
There is a constitutional dimension to criminal discovery
54. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
65. 261 La. 722, 260 So.2d 682 (1972).
56. 250 La. 295, 195 So.2d 273 (1967).
67. State v. Migliore, 261 La. 722, 742, 260 So.2d 682, 689 (1972).
58. It may well be that State v. Jones, 263 La. 164, 267 So.2d 559 (1972),
will have the effect of limiting Migliore to its facts. In distinguishing the
cases, the court in Jones said that the case before It did not involve the
possession of a substance which is criminal merely by virtue of its chemical
composition.
59. It was not at all unusual during prohibition to get the same kind
of discovery order. See, e.g., State v. McCrary, 164 La. 1057, 115 So. 268 (1927);
State v. Lowery, 160 La. 811, 107 So. 683 (1926); State v. Bramhall, 134 La.
1, 63 So. 603 (1913).
[Vol. 33
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which has not yet been touched upon. The United States
Supreme Court announced in Brady v. Maryland0 the rule that
"the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to the guilt or to punishment irrespective of
the good or bad faith of the prosecution." 61
Strictly speaking, the Brady line of cases is said to relate
to prosecutorial "disclosure," as distinguished from "discovery"
by the defense . 2 It is difficult, however, to conceive of a duty
to disclose without a corresponding right to discover. Likewise,
the distinction between the terms is de-emphasized by the fact
that there must be a request by the defense before the defen-
dant's due process rights are violated by the refusal of the
prosecution to disclose material, favorable evidence. Despite
these problems, the distinction can serve a useful purpose. The
reader is alerted that when the term disclosure is used, it is
intended to have a more limited meaning than discovery.
It has been asserted by respectable authority that "Brady v.
Maryland did not deal in any way with pre-trial discovery by
defendant .... "6 Other authorities have taken a more flexible,
and what is believed to be a more reasonable approach. The
Fifth Circuit has expressed its opinion that:
"It is now clear that Brady imposes an affirmative duty on
the prosecution to produce at the appropriate time requested
evidence which is materially favorable to the accused either
as direct or impeaching evidence." 64 (Emphasis added.)
Another federal appellate court has expressed a similar view:
60. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
61. Id. at 87.
62. Note, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 92, 93 (1965): "On the one hand, dis-
covery emphasizes the right of the defense to obtain access to evidence
necessary to prepare its own case; on the other, disclosure stresses the
duty of the prosecution to make available to the accused the evidence and
testimony without which an adequate defense would be virtually impossible."
63. United States v. Armantrout, 278 F. Supp. 517, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Other cases asserting the same position are United States v. Wolfson, 289
F. Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993
(D.N.J. 1968); United States v. Manhatten Brush Co., 38 F.R.D. 4 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); State v. Gillespie, 227 So.2d 550 (Fla. App. 1969); State v. Drayton,
226 So.2d 469 (Fla. App. 1969).




"The importance of Brady, then, is its holding that the con-
cept out of which the constitutional dimension arises in these
cases, is prejudice to the defendant measured by the effect
of the suppression upon the defendant's preparation for trial,
rather than its effect upon the jury's verdict. '0 5
The thrust of these decisions and others that have adopted
similar views0 6 is that Brady sought to assure that the defendant
would be treated with fundamental fairness and not hindered
by the state in the presentation of his defense. Furthermore,
in cases where disclosure is required, it must be made at a
time when it would not be useless to the defense. Obviously,
this means that in some cases there is a constitutional duty
to disclose evidence to the accused before trial.
One such case in Louisiana would be presented by the facts
of Ashley v. Texas.6 The defendant, charged with murder, was
examined by two psychiatrists who reported to the district attor-
ney that, in their opinion, the defendant was legally incom-
petent to stand trial. The defense counsel, without knowledge
of the reports, advised his client to plead not guilty. In reversing
the conviction the court, without citing Brady, held that the
failure of the district attorney to inform defense counsel of the
results of the examinations was so fundamentally unfair that
it amounted to a denial of due process. It would be necessary
in Louisiana that the defense receive this information before
trial because evidence of insanity could not be introduced after
a plea of not guilty.61
From this discussion, therefore, it is evident that there is
some support for the dictum in Clack v. Reid. 9 While it is still
true that the state need not open its files to the defendant prior
65. United States v. Polis, 416 F.2d 573, 577 (2d Cir. 1969).
66. E.g., United States v. Cullen, 305 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Wis. 1969);
United States v. Curry, 278 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ill. 1967); United States v.
Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
67. 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963).
68. LA. CODs CRiM. P. art. 651: "When a defendant is tried upon a plea
of 'not guilty,' evidence of insanity or mental defect at the time of the of-
fense shall not be admissible.
"The defenses available under a combined plea of 'not guilty and not
guilty by reason of insanity' shall be tried together."
69. 441 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 33
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to trial,70 there is a growing realization that there is a constitu-
tional dimension to criminal discovery.7 1
The present state of the law on discovery in Louisiana is
unsatisfactory. It is impossible to foresee the direction the trial
courts will take armed with the discretion approved by Migliore,
and there is at least a possibility that the federal courts will
impose more scattered requirements. Illinois was in a similar
position in 1969 when an intermediate appellate court held that
the trial judge had unlimited discretion to order discovery in
criminal cases.72 Even though Illinois had had considerable ex-
perience with much more liberal discovery practices than those
of Louisiana, the state, realizing the uncertainty and inconsis-
tencies that would inevitably result under such circumstances,
argued not that the decision was wrong, but that the Illinois
supreme court should exercise the power that had been dele-
gated to it and establish a uniform system of discovery rules.7 8
In response to the state's argument, the court appointed a com-
mittee to draft a system of discovery rules and remanded the
case with directions to proceed according to the rules.
The course taken by Illinois is to be commended. The state
recognized that criminal discovery was inevitable. Louisiana
should adopt a similar approach. With the detailed guidelines
provided by the American Bar Association, the task of enacting
a comprehensive plan for discovery should be a relatively easy
one.74 The enactment of such a plan would not only lend pre-
dictability to trial court dispositions of discovery questions, but
would also eliminate many of the useless appeals that are now
wasting judicial time. Likewise, the flexibility of a good frame-
work of discovery rules is better suited to the problems of the
area than would be scattered constitutional or judicially created
rules. If discovery should be raised to a constitutional issue as
it appears that it may be, and as some have suggested that it
70. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
71. See Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and the Prosecution
-The Developing Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REv. 437 (1972);
Thode, Criminal Discovery: Constitutional Minimums and Statutory Grants
in Texas, 1 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 183 (1970); Comment, The Prosecutor's Con-
stitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964).
72, People v. Crawford, 114 Ill. App. 2d 230, 252 N.E.2d 483 (1969).
73. Zagel & Carr, State Criminal Discovery and the New Illinois Rules,
1971 U. ILL. L.F. 557, 573-76 (1971).
74. ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY.
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should be,75 protective orders71 will become difficult, if not im-
possible, to obtain. It is to be observed that the decisions that
tend to push back the frontiers of the constitutional dimension
invariably originate in restrictive or oppressive state or lower
court decisions.77
The reason most often given in support of criminal dis-
covery is fairness to the accused.78 As has been previously ob-
served, it may well be that the accused is at a disadvantage in
a criminal proceeding. Fairness, it will be recalled, was the
reason given in United States v. Burr in 1807, 71 and it was obvi-
ously the reason behind Brady.5 0 It is often unfair to the defense
attorney, as well as the defendant, to expect him to represent
an individual without some information from the state. The
defendant, particularly an indigent defendant, may be unwilling
or unable to cooperate with his attorney. Under these circum-
stances the attorney cannot plan an intelligent defense, nor can
he give his client proper advice on such matters as the advis-
ability of a plea bargain.
The ABA Standards, however, were not shaped by argu-
ments such as that above. The editorial remarks stress such
reasons as the need to lend more finality to criminal disposi-
tions, to speed up and simplify the criminal process, and to
use our resources more economically.8 ' One of the more im-
portant objectives is to bring potential constitutional problems
to the surface and dispose of them at an early date. It is also
believed that a defendant with greater knowledge of the state's
evidence will be more likely to plead guilty. A tentative evalua-
tion of expanded discovery under the Standards indicated that
discovery appeared to be
75. See note 71 supra.
76. ABA STANDARDS DISCOVERY § 4.4: "Upon a showing of cause, the court
may at any time order that specified disclosures be restricted or deferred,
or make such other order as is appropriate, provided that all material and
information to which a party is entitled must be disclosed in time to permit
his counsel to make beneficial use thereof."
77. See, e.g., Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Miller v. Pate, 386
U.S. 1 (1967); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Clack v. Reid, 441 F.2d
801 (5th Cir. 1971); State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So.2d 273 (1945). Cf.
Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
78. E.g., State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953) (Brennan, dissent-
ing).
79. 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
80. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
81. ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY.
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"increasing the efficiency of judges and lawyers, speeding
up the process, improving the performance of defense coun-
sel, eliminating a substantial amount of paperwork, making
trials shorter and more to the point, and increasing the
number of guilty pleas-all apparently without any sacrifice
to the interests of the government or the defendant. 8 2
Criminal discovery could also work more directly to the
advantage of the state. It is quite probable that the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Florida88 uphold-
ing Florida's notice-of-alibi statute, another state discovery
device, would have been different had it not been for the sub-
stantial discovery concessions to the defendant under Florida
law. That decision made it clear that the time had come for the
tired argument against criminal discovery, that it is a one-way
street in view of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, to be put to rest.
The Williams decision was foreshadowed by an earlier deci-
sion of the California supreme court, Jones v. Superior Court.
84
The defendant, charged with rape, sought a continuance alleging
that he was impotent and needed time to gather medical evi-
dence. The court considered the liberal discovery that was avail-
able to a defendant" and, reasoning that it should not be a one-
way street, allowed state discovery of X-rays and reports that
the defendant intended to introduce and the names and addresses
of intended defense witnesses. It was explained that to allow
state discovery of evidence that the defendant intended to
produce at trial would not violate his privilege against self-
incrimination since it was merely requiring him to decide at
an earlier time whether he would remain silent or disclose the
information. In any event such information should be exculpa-
tory rather than incriminating. In Williams and Jones, the respec-
tive courts observed that all the defendant was losing was a
chance to surprise the state. The right of the state to discovery
of defense evidence was subsequently affirmed and expanded
82. Id. at 9.
83. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
84. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
85. See, Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 228 (1964).
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in other cases,86 and other states such as Illinois have gone even
further in this direction than California.817
It is an elementary observation that surprise has no legit-
imate place in a criminal proceeding, whether resorted to by
the defense or the state. The promulgation of a comprehensive,
systematic set of discovery rules will do much to take the games-
manship out of the criminal process. Louisiana should take the
step that will lead to a fairer trial for an accused and at the
same time improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of
the courts. Nothing can possibly be gained by ignoring the ques-
tion while further random requirements are imposed by the
courts.
James A. Rountree
86. People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963);
Shabo, Prosecution Discovery in Criminal Cases: The California Supreme
Court Confronts the Problem of Self-Incrimination Anew, 46 L.A.B. BULL.
61 (1970).
87. Illinois Supreme Court Rules of Criminal Discovery, Rule 41360,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ll0A § 413 (1971). This rule requires the defense on motion
of the state to inform the state of any defense intended to be made at a
hearing or trial subject, of course, to constitutional limitations.
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